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‘Many people will have the feeling that we have been sitting in an ever-
faster moving rollercoaster in the past weeks. One asks oneself: is this
really happening? After all, the measures taken here and abroad are
unheard of for countries in times of peace.’
This is how Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte addressed the nation on the COVID-19
pandemic in a televised speech on 16 March. Such addresses are an extreme
rarity in the Netherlands, occurring less than once a decade. Throughout, Rutte
rhetorically placed himself in the same situation as the other inhabitants of the
country, emphasizing how ‘we’ all face the same challenge and have to get through
this ‘together’. He explained various possible scenarios of combating the virus and
indicated that the government would rely on the views of (predominantly medical)
experts – a view he has repeated many times since.
By contrast the speech does not refer in any way to a state of emergency – apart
from obliquely in the quote above – nor to the constitution or in fact to any law
in general. This framing of the speech was deliberate, as the government has
very much relied on giving heavy-handed advice to the population and calling for
responsible behaviour, with regulatory measures taking a backseat, at least in its
communication.
Apart from the explicit and very visible reliance on experts – the director of the
national health institute features in nearly every other press conference of the
government – a second non-legal consideration seems to quite clearly guide the
current government coalition: public opinion. Halfway through March, all schools
were closed in spite of health expert finding this unnecessary. The direct reason
for this decision seems to have been the growing calls in society for that measure.
The same drive seems to have guided the announced partial re-opening of primary
education as of the 10th of May. This double drive – expertise-based but with a
visible concern for public opinion – seems to really guide the communication of the
government, in which Mark Rutte constantly acts as explainer-in-chief of what he
has dubbed an ‘intelligent lockdown’, taking his audience step-by-step through the
rationales of measures taken.
While this communication strategy may have been rather effective, even leading
to initial praise and support of many opposition parties, the tools applied by the
government and by local authorities to secure public health and enforce lockdown
advice are more problematic. We will discuss a number of such legal issues related
to the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights here.
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No Formal State of Emergency
The first thing to note is that the Dutch government has chosen not to formally deal
with the situation as a state of emergency in the legal sense, neither under national
constitutional law nor under international law.
Under international law, the Netherlands has in this crisis not formally derogated
from the most relevant human rights treaties, the ECHR and the ICCPR, contrary to
a number of other European states. In fact, it has not even been a political issue at
all. This is all the more remarkable, as international human rights have traditionally
played a prominent role in Dutch legal practice. The Constitution provides for
the precedence of key international human rights over domestic law. And since
judges are not allowed to test laws against the Constitution, international treaties, in
particular the ECHR, have for decades played this role of constitutional safeguards
in the daily practice of Dutch court cases.
Under the Dutch constitution, states of emergency have traditionally been linked
to situations of war and large-scale natural disaster. Article 103 of the Constitution
provides the basis for legislation that now embodies ‘flexible crisis management’
rather than distinct formal categories of emergency situations, although these can
still be found in the statute on the coordination of the law concerning emergency
situations (Coördinatiewet uitzonderingstoestanden).
There is a separate category of health emergency law laid down in the Public Health
Act (Wet publieke gezondheid). This Act provides for quarantine measures and
classifies categories of infectious diseases and the appropriate measures and
powers that are available to deal with each of those. The decision-making powers
with regard to quarantine and similar measures are largely a matter of municipal
authorities. The assumption has been that infectious diseases would first have to
be contained locally. Article 7 of the Act empowers the Minister of public health to
instruct mayors with regard to the use of their powers.
In the early stages of the Corona crisis however, it soon became apparent that
the municipal approach would not be sufficient, since large-scale infections in the
southern provinces could very rapidly spread to the rest of the country, as had been
demonstrated in Italy. The Minister of public health therefore used his powers under
Article 7 of the Public Health Act to instruct mayors to issue emergency regulations.
Now this is where the legal issues tend to become really complicated.
As a key step, the ministerial instructions were directed to the Security regions
(veiligheidsregio’s). These bodies – 25 in total – exist on the basis of the Security
regions Act (Wet veiligheidsregio’s) which dates from 2010. They are functional
bodies with powers in the field of fire brigades, disaster and crisis management, and
medical assistance (in the context of disasters and crises). Over the past decade,
this Act has been revised at least a dozen times, which indicates that the Security
regions are still in development. Importantly, the Chairman of the security regions
(usually the mayor of a big city) can exercise emergency powers that normally would
only be exercised by all municipal mayors (there are 355 of them) and are provided
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in the Municipality Act (Articles 172-177). Article 39, para. 1 gives an exclusive
power to the Chairman of the security region.
After the first signs of the seriousness of the current outbreak, the security regions
started reacting with emergency regulations (noodverordeningen). Initially slightly
different per region, the regulations were rapidly coordinated and harmonised to
prevent ‘waterbed effects’ (people moving from one part of the country to another
part with ‘lighter’ rules). On the same assumption national frontiers were more or less
closed off so people could not move from Belgium and Germany to the Netherlands
(and vice versa). The closing of the Dutch-German border took the form of ‘advice’
by Dutch police and customs officers telling potential tourists that the Netherlands
had lost most of its attraction because tourist accommodations and restaurants and
even ‘coffeeshops’ had closed down. The emergency regulations however do not
have the status of advice, they are binding rules. Criminal sanctions are attached
and enforcement can and will take place, and has indeed taken place.
A couple of constitutional oddities should be noted here:
Firstly, the municipal mayoral powers are intended to deal with large-scale
unforeseen disruptions of the public order.  Think of riots by hooligans in the
context of football matches, or new year’s eve riots that may explode into large-
scale disruptions. Occasionally, the emergency powers have been used to prevent
activities by motorcycle clubs or in order to evacuate people in case of a fire in a
chemical plant or an explosion of a fireworks factory.
Secondly, these powers are intended to be strictly temporal, and thirdly they have to
be notified immediately to the democratically elected municipal council which has to
ratify them in order to remain valid. If ratification is refused (which to our knowledge
has never happened) the emergency regulation will end immediately.
Fourthly, there is no power to deviate from any provision in the Constitution
(Grondwet), including the fundamental rights in Chapter 1 of the Constitution.
Importantly, freedom of movement has not been included in the constitutional
catalogue of rights, and is protected in the Netherlands only on the basis of Article 2
of Protocol No. 4 ECHR.
The first problem with the current emergency regulations is their democratic
legitimacy. There is no democratically elected body on the level of the security
regions, so any kind of control there is impossible. Only municipal mayors may
object, but they are not democratically elected in the Netherlands.
The second problem has to do with some of the content of the regulations. Although
generally wise, and based on sound scientific advice, there are parts which would
be better dealt with in primary legislation, and which invite further reflection. In due
course there has to be a thorough evaluation of this form of emergency law. For
now, we will very briefly point out only a few elements.
Some sections of the emergency regulations directly affect fundamental rights.
There is a prohibition on ‘meetings’ (samenkomsten) of more than 30 people (and
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more than 100 if the meeting is necessary for the continuation of activities by
‘institutions, companies and other organisations’, under the strict condition that social
distancing will be applied). In the Netherlands, social distancing means a minimum
of 1.5 metres from the next person. This prohibition is applicable to meetings in
public but also – controversially – to meetings ‘outside the public space’. The legal
problem here is that municipal regulations emergency relations can only deal with
public events, i.e. events in public spaces. The private sphere can be regulated by
primary legislation, but so far that has not happened in the current context. The most
controversial part is the prohibition on religious and secular meetings. Article 6 of
the Constitution only allows for regulation based on primary legislation with regard
to the exercise of freedom of religion and secular conviction outside buildings and
closed spaces.  Within these buildings and spaces, not even the primary legislator
has any power. Some mayors, like Ahmed Aboutaleb of Rotterdam, have wisely
‘advised’ their citizens not to come together in churches, synagogues and mosques,
and equally wisely, people have followed this advice. Enforcement within those
buildings would run into legal problems. Of course, one could imagine that streets
surrounding those buildings could be made forbidden territory, but even then that
would preferably be done by government and parliament in primary legislation.
A second problem is the prohibition of educational activities, which is so broad that it
is most likely in conflict with Article 23 of the Constitution on the freedom to provide
educational services (although primary education will be allowed to partialyl resume
as of 11 May). A third problem for further discussion would be the general prohibition
– directed to care homes – to give access to visitors (with only minor exceptions).
This has turned out to be very detrimental to large numbers of patients and their
relatives, and its proportionality is controversial. 
Since some of the defects of the emergency regulations have now partly been
recognised, media have reported that primary legislation on some of these issues is
now being considered by the government. This may help, but further developments
in this area will have to be critically evaluated.
Very Light Oversight
Since the start of the crisis in the Netherlands halfway March, the key actors in
rule of law oversight, the legislative and the judiciary, seem to have gone largely in
self-imposed lockdown. The Second Chamber of Parliament – the most important
legislative and political body in the Dutch constitutional setup – rescinded its weekly
meetings from three days to only one. And these weekly debates were entirely
dedicated to debating the government’s anti-pandemic measures and to being
updated by experts. The (part-time) Senate or First Chamber even stopped meeting
physically altogether. It asked and received advice from the Dutch Council of
State on 20 April to the effect that online meetings would be allowed under the
Constitution, a novelty that has been criticised.
Although questions by Parliament to the government may still be asked in written
form as well as requests for information, this means that debates on any other
government policy, including on key European summits on the pandemic and
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its economic consequences, were not taking place. This does not mean that
government stopped functioning – to the contrary, the governing coalition identified
no less than 84 legislative proposals as so urgent that they could not wait until after
the crisis. Only through pushbacks of the President of the Second Chamber was this
list somewhat rescinded. And since halfway through April, committee meetings on
specific issues were restarted in debating rooms in which physical distancing was
possible. Although not by any means going as far as Hungary, the Dutch Parliament,
at least initially, has really hampered its own democratic oversight functionality.
The judiciary trod a similar path of self-lockdowns. As of 17 March, all court buildings
closed and only urgent cases were allowed to proceed, including a number of
criminal cases, bankruptcy proceedings, and urgent migration and family law
matters. But the large majority of legal proceedings in the Netherlands became
invisible, online, written proceedings handled by court registries and judges working
from home, turning court buildings into almost as empty premises as schools or
restaurants. Justice was barely seen to be done anymore. Again, only recently has
it been decided to start re-opening court buildings and from 11 May onwards on-
site proceedings will to a limited extent be enabled again, mostly in the fields of
criminal and family law. In only very few instances have Corona-related government
measures been battled in judicial proceedings, mostly unsuccessfully so far.
In addition, oversight by the media, although full of lively and free debate on all
cuurent policy choices made, is made more difficult: the government announced at
the end of April that dealing with requests under access to information legislation
about COVID-19-related policies would be put on hold until at least 1 June.
The Elephant(s) in the Room
As the above shows, the Dutch authorities take a quasi-legal, quasi-rhetorical
approach to shape their intelligent lockdown and try to tame the pandemic beast,
with questionable constitutional practices as a result. While the reliance on medical
and other expertise might be a welcome difference compared to some other
countries featured in this blog series, overreliance on experts in communication may
hide real political and legal choices that have been made. Almost a decade ago,
Prime Minister Rutte publicly lauded his own pragmatic and technocratic approach to
politics by stating that having a vision is like ‘an elephant that takes away your view’.
In this crisis, the constitutional and other legal issues may be a bit too hidden behind
the elephants of expediency and pragmatism.
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